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ARTICLES

CRUMBS FROM THE MASTER'S TABLE: THE
SUPREME COURT, PRO SE DEFENDANTS AND
THE FEDERAL GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
Julian A. Cook, III*
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has issued a
series of significant rulings that have fundamentally set back the constitutional and statutory interests of defendants in the plea bargaining
and guilty plea contexts. Though comparatively low-profile, each of
these decisions has profoundly contributed to a conscious or subconscious design on the part of the Court to lessen defendant interests
under both the United States Constitution and Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure'-the rule that governs judicial conduct
and details defendant rights with respect to the entry, receipt, and
withdrawal of guilty pleas-while preserving the efficiency of a guilty
plea system through which approximately ninety-five percent of all
2
federal cases are resolved.
Among the more recent decisions-and a principal subject of
this Article-is Iowa v. Tovar.3 Decided in 2004, the Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment does not require that a defendant
*
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1 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
2 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2001, at 2 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
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3 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
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who is contemplating entering a guilty plea be advised of two warnings
deemed to be essential by the Iowa Supreme Court: namely, that
"waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty
[entails] the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked," and "that
by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether . . . it is wise to plead

guilty." 4 Instead, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment
standard is satisfied merely by informing a defendant of three items:
the nature of the charges, "his right to be counseled regarding his
plea," and the permissible punishments attendant to the defendant's
guilty plea. 5 In concluding that the more scripted admonitions urged
by the Iowa court were unnecessary, the Supreme Court reasoned that
its prior precedent required only a generalized comprehension of the
consequences associated with a counsel waiver, and that the knowledge base required to effectuate a valid waiver is variable and necessa6
rily dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Despite the intimation that its decision should be narrowly construed, 7 the unanimity of the Court, the wholesale rejection of rather
basic informational verbiage, and the greater context in which the decision was rendered, ensures that, barring remedial legislative action,
Tovarwill have ramifications that stand to adversely influence generations of defendants. Though a primary focus of this Article will be
upon the Tovar decision and its impact upon prospective pro se litigants, this Article will also unveil how Tovar is but part of a more expansive effort on the part of the Supreme Court in recent years to
delimit the interests of criminal defendants-regardless of representational status-in the guilty plea process. In so doing, this Article will
describe a federal guilty plea structure characterized by rules and procedures that work together to limit a defendant's informational intake, while ensuring the efficiency of the guilty plea process. It will
describe the Supreme Court's critical role in this process, and depict a
Court seemingly bent upon ensuring the maintenance of an efficient
federal guilty plea structure even if some of the most rudimentary
constitutional interests of a defendant must be sacrificed in the process. It will further illuminate .how Tovar fits neatly within this
4 Id. at 81.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 87-92. In addition, the Court took note of Tovar's failure to allege that
he did not comprehend the nature of the charge or the range of allowable punishments, or assert that he was unaware of his right to counsel at the time of his arraignment. Id. at 92-93.
7 The Court stated that it was addressing only a narrow question: whether the
two admonitions at issue were required by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 91.
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grander design and demonstrate how, through the setting up of informational roadblocks, defendants are not only indirectly encouraged
to admit their guilt, but the systemic efficiency of the guilty plea structure is preserved.
To see this cohesiveness, this Article will commence with a review
of the rather significant evolution of Rule 11, including a review of
several pertinent Supreme Court decisions that have helped shape its
current structure. Thereafter, the predominant judicial methodology
for conducting Rule 11 hearings will be discussed. Specifically, this
Article will take a brief but critical look at, inter alia, the examination
techniques employed by the judiciary when conducting Rule 11 hearings, and conclude that the process typically employed inadequately
assesses whether a defendant's guilty plea was entered into knowingly
and voluntarily. Next, this Article will discuss two very recent Supreme Court decisions- United States v. Vonn, 8 decided in 2002, and
Bradshaw v. Stumpf 9 decided in 2005-that have substantially aggravated the already aggrieved Rule 11 hearing process described in the
preceding section. More specifically, this Article will show how Vonn
and Bradshaw have greatly eased an already fluid Rule 11 process for
the judiciary by placing unrealistic and unjust burdens and obstacles
upon the defendant when claiming judicial noncompliance with Rule
11. Thereafter, this Article will turn its attention to the 1997 Supreme
Court case of United States v. Hyde,10 and the accompanying 2002
amendment to Rule 11 which codified that Supreme Court decision.
Through the employment of contract law principles, this Article will
succinctly describe how the plea withdrawal rules unfairly bind unwary
defendants to their guilty pleas (thereby preventing defendants from
pursuing more optimal strategic alternatives) without providing a corresponding right to enforce the underlying plea agreement.
This Article will then undertake an in-depth review and critique
of Tovar. In discussing Tovar, this Article will examine Supreme
Court precedent as it has developed regarding the waiver of Sixth
Amendment counsel rights and, in the end, argue that the Court's
minimalist construction of the Amendment fails in its interpretation.
It will further argue that the required admonitions delineated in
Tovar, in conjunction with the standard practices across the various
circuits, fail to illuminate the pitfalls and consequences associated
with the guilty plea process as well as the benefits of counsel in the
guilty plea context. Thereafter, this Article will conclude with a pro8

535 U.S. 55 (2002).

9 125 S. Ct. 2398 (2005).
10 520 U.S. 670 (1997).
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posal section. In it this Article will detail those admonitions that
should be provided to defendants by virtue of the Sixth Amendment,
as well as suggest additional warnings that should be part of a legislative remedy. Together the required admonitions, if ultimately
adopted, will ensure that defendants contemplating such counsel
waivers are better informed of the benefits of counsel and better
equipped to gauge the consequences attendant to each choice.
I.

RULE

11

AND THE FEDERAL GUILTY PLEA HEARING PROCESS

Prior to 1975, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
rather simply and generally provided:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant
refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if
a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea
of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of
guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.1 1
However, in response to the 1969 Supreme Court case of Boykin
v. Alabamal2-which held that a trial court could not accept a guilty
plea absent some affirmative showing that it was entered knowingly
and voluntarilyl 3-Rule
11 underwent a massive restructuring. In
place of the four sentences that characterized the pre-1975 version,
the revised 1975 version of Rule 11 was notable not only for its sheer
depth, but also for the extensive affirmative obligations it placed upon
the district courts prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea. 14 The more
generally stated expectations that characterized the earlier version of
the rule were replaced with a detailed list of requirements.1 5 For example, Rule 11 currently provides that a district court "must address
the defendant personally in open court" and "must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands," inter alia,
the nature of the charges, the various penalties associated with his
plea of guilt, the array of constitutional trial-related rights that he is
11 FED. R. CruM. P. 11 (1966) (amended 1975).
12 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
13 Id. at 242.
14 Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 416 U.S. 1001, 1006-07
(1973).
15 Id.
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necessarily forfeiting, as well as the rights that might be forfeited pursuant to any appellate waiver provision contained within a plea agreement. 16 In addition, the rule requires district courts to ensure that
the guilty plea was entered voluntarily17 and that there is a supporting
factual basis. 8
Despite the laudable intentions that presumably underlied the
1975 amendments, the promises of the new rule have been significantly undercut by the manner in which Rule 11 has been imple16 FED. R. CiuM. P. 11. Subsection (b)(1) provides:
Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the court accepts a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed under oath, and the
court must address the defendant personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following:

(A) the government's right, in a prosecution for perjury or false statement,
to use against the defendant any statement that the defendant gives
under oath;
(B) the fight to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded, to persist in
that plea;
(C) the right to ajury trial;
(D) the right to be represented by counsel-and if necessary have the court
appoint counsel-at trial and at every other stage of the proceeding;
(E) the fight at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to be
protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and present evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses;
(F) the defendant's waiver of these trial rights if the court accepts a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere;
(G) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading;
(H) any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and
term of supervised release;
(I) any mandatory minimum penalty;
(J) any applicable forfeiture;
(K) the court's authority to order restitution;
(L) the court's obligation to impose a special assessment;
(M) the court's obligation to apply the Sentencing Guidelines, and the
court's discretion to depart from those guidelines under some circumstances; and
(N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal
or to collaterally attack the sentence.
Id. R. 11(b)(1).
17 FED. R. CRiM. P. Il(b)(2) ("Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises
(other than the promises in a plea agreement.").
18 FED. R. CRiM. P. ll(b)(3) ("Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the
court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.").
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mented. Due, in large part, to the rule's plain language, the
assessment of a plea's validity has too often been determined through
a judicial colloquy strewn with leading and compound questions. 19
20
Though prohibited either outright or in part in the trial context,
there are no comparable evidentiary restrictions on their use during
the Rule 11 process. Yet, the dangers that rationally justify the
prohibitions at trial are equally present in the Rule 11 context. With
respect to leading questions, for example, the commonality of interests that exists between the direct examiner and the witness at trial
underlie the general prohibition of such questions on direct examination.2 Yet, this same commonality is existent during the Rule 11 process. Like the witness at trial who views the direct-examiner as a
means to a litigative end, the defendant-witness during the Rule 11
process views the examiner (the judge) in the same vein. 22 Just as a
police officer considers the questions posed by a prosecutor as a
19 For a more thorough treatment of this contention, see Barajas v. Castro, No. C
00-04075 WHA, 2002 WL 202440, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2002) (noting that "compound questions are normal in plea colloquys [sic]"); Julian A. Cook, III, Federal
Guilty Pleas UnderRule 11: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Post-Boykin Era, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 597, 615-24 (2002).
20 FED. R. EVID. 611 (c) (detailing the limits upon the employment of leading
questions at trial); CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6164, at 354 (3d ed. 1993) ("A compound question simultaneously
poses more than one inquiry and calls for more than one answer. Such a question
presents two problems. First, the question may be ambiguous because of its multiple
facets and complexity. Second, any answer may be confusing because of uncertainty
as to which part of the compound question the witness intended to address. Where a
compound question has been posed, the court may require that its component questions be posed separately. Where a compound question has been posed and answered, the court may require that the answer be clarified so as to eliminate
confusion. However, where the answer's content or context makes its meaning clear,
no such clarification is needed. Further, even where there is confusion, the court has
discretion under Rule 611(a) to deny objections on the ground the objecting party
has the opportunity to clarify matters on cross-examination.").
21 See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 20, § 415, at 142-43 ("The use of leading questions is left very largely to the control of the court. They 'should not be used' on
direct examination of a witness 'except as may be necessary to develop the witness
testimony,' but a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party may be interrogated by leading questions. Leading questions are ordinarily to be permitted on cross-examination. Even when leading questions are
permitted, they may not properly be put unless the inference, if drawn, would be
factually true.").
22 Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2004) ("IT]he district court
commented that 'the prosecuting attorney's explanation of the plea agreement was
somewhat difficult to follow, and that criminal defendants in such situations will often
answer questions posed by the trial court without a clear understanding of each and
every term uttered especially if advised by counsel to do just that.'").
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means through which the defendant's conviction can be achieved, the
defendant-witness during a guilty plea hearing considers the Rule 11
colloquy as a means through which he can achieve the benefits of his
negotiated bargain (e.g., sentencing reduction). Each witness has an
equally compelling disincentive to contradict the questions posed by
his examiner so long as the witness perceives that his litigative objectives are not being compromised. Thus, when asking such leading
and compound questions, the court is no more effectively gauging a
defendant's knowledge or voluntariness than a direct-examiner at trial
would reliably be eliciting accurate and truthful testimony if permitted to lead his witness. Indeed, the judge's questions of the pleading
defendant are less likely to elicit knowledgeable answers since a factwitness at trial is more likely to understand his experiences to which
he is testifying than a lay defendant is likely to understand the legalities of the charges to which he is pleading and the nature of the rights
being waived.
It is certainly easy to empathize with the district courts charged
with implementing Rule 11. Thrust with a host of affirmative obligations to inform, the plain text of Rule 11 leaves district courts little
discretion but to employ such questioning techniques when fulfilling
its statutory obligations. As a result, the employment of these questioning modes has effectively assisted in the stampeding of hordes of
defendants through the Rule 11 plea process without providing a
meaningful measurement of the plea's underlying validity.
Aside from the methodology issue, whether a district court's noncompliance with the various Rule 11 requirements warranted automatic reversal divided the circuits for years after the 1975
amendments. At the heart of the debate was the 1969 Supreme Court
case of McCarthy v. United States.23 Given the district court's failure in
that case to discuss the elements of the charge (tax evasion) with the
defendant, 24 McCarthy held that the court's neglect of this Rule 11
mandate required automatic reversal. 25 However, since that case addressed a district court's omission under the abbreviated pre-1975 version of Rule 11, the circuits were divided as to whether the automatic
reversal sanction was required given the complexity of the more ex23 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
24 Id. at 463, 470. In light of the discussion of United States v. Vonn, 355 U.S. 55
(2002), see infra Part I.A., it should be noted that McCarthy failed to object to the
court's failure to make inquiry of this matter. Yet this failure did not prevent the
Court from finding that Rule 11 had been violated and that the defendant should be
afforded the opportunity to plead anew. 394 U.S. at 461, 464, 471.
25

394 U.S. at 471-72.
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pansive 1975 version of the rule. 26 Much of the controversy was set-

fled in 1983, however, when Rule 11 was amended to include a
harmless error provision. 2 7 That rule currently provides that "[a] variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error if it does not
affect substantial rights." 2 8 As a consequence of this amendment, the
automatic reversal remedy was rendered obsolete. Nevertheless, as
the next section demonstrates, yet another related issue continued to
divide the circuit courts for years thereafter.
A.

United States v. Vonn

Despite the enactment of the harmless error provision, the circuits continued to wrestle with a related, but unresolved, issue;
namely, whether a defendant was subject to the plain error rule requirements if he failed to object to a judicial omission under Rule 11,
or whether the burden should be carried by the prosecution to
demonstrate that the judicial error was harmless. This issue was recently settled in 2002 when the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Vonn. 29 There, during Vonn's guilty plea hearing-at which he had
entered guilty pleas to armed bank robbery and a firearm chargethe court neglected to inform him that by pleading guilty he would be
forfeiting his right to counsel at trial.3 0 However, the defendant failed
to object to this judicial omission.A' Instead, after moving unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty pleas, Vonn raised the issue of the judicial
omission for the first time on direct appeal. 32 The Ninth Circuit held
that, despite the defendant's failure to object, the government nevertheless bore the burden of demonstrating that the judicial error had
no effect on the substantial rights of the defendant. 33 Finding that
the government had failed to satisfy its burden, the Ninth Circuit va34
cated the defendant's convictions.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit. 35 The

Court recognized that the harmless error provision contained in Rule
26 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.5, at 1020-21 (4th ed.
2004).
27 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h) advisory committee's notes (1983 amend.).
28 FED. R. CRIM. P. II(h).

29 535 U.S. 55.
30 Id. at 60.
31 Id. at 60-61.
32 Id. at 61.
33

United States v. Vonn, 224 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, 535 U.S.
Id. at 1155-56.
535 U.S. at 62.
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11 (h), a virtual mirror of the plain error rule found in Rule 52 (a) ,36
failed to include any language comparable to that found in Rule
52(b) 3 7 which places the burden of demonstrating judicial error
upon the party who failed to raise the issue below.38 Yet, it rejected

Vonn's contention that this omission reflected a congressional intent
that the government shoulder the burden of demonstrating harmlessness. 39 Instead, the Court held that a defendant who is silent as to a
judicial omission under Rule 11 must bear the burden, like any other
litigant alleging plain error, of demonstrating that his substantial
rights were affected. 40 In rejecting the contention that Rule 52(b)
"has no application to Rule 11 errors,'

41

the Court recognized, with

respect to collateral review, that it is the defendant, not the government, who must demonstrate that "the Rule 11 proceeding was 'inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure' or
constituted a 'complete miscarriage of justice.' ' 42 The Court also insisted that the omission of Rule 52 (b) type language from Rule 11 (h)
is subject to variable interpretations, not just that proffered by Vonn.
The Court suggested that it is equally plausible, for example, to interpret the omission as reflecting a congressional intent to preclude appellate review in its entirety whenever a defendant failed to lodge an
43
objection during a Rule 11 hearing.
In addition, the Court reasoned that its holding is consistent with
the plea withdrawal rules which create a "near presumption" against
the granting of such motions after the imposition of sentence. 44 Reflecting a pragmatic outlook, the Court declared that both the plea
withdrawal rules and the rule announced in Vonn promote, inter alia,
"the finality required in a system as heavily dependent on guilty pleas
as ours." 45 The Court also reasoned that the adoption of Vonn's posi36 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 (a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.").
37 FED. R. CriM. P. 52(b) ("A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention."); see Vonn, 535
U.S. at 62-63 ("When an appellate court considers error that qualifies as plain, the
tables are turned on demonstrating the substantiality of any effect on a defendant's
rights: the defendant who sat silent at trial has the burden to show that his 'substantial
rights' were affected.").
38 535 U.S. at 62-63.
39 Id. at 63.
40 Id.
41
Id. at 65.
42 Id. at 63-64 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
43 Id. at 65-66.
44 Id. at 72.
45 Id.
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tion would encourage defendants in the midst of a Rule 11 proceeding to engage in litigative gamesmanship. Specifically, the Court
opined that Vonn's construction of the harmless error rule would create a disincentive among defendants to raise objections during the
Rule 11 process:
But the incentive to think and act early when Rule 11 is at stake
would prove less substantial ifVonn's position were law; a defendant
could choose to say nothing about a judge's plain lapse under Rule
11 until the moment of taking a direct appeal, at which time the
burden would always fall on the Government to prove harmlessness.
A defendant could simply relax and wait to see if the sentence later
struck him as satisfactory; if not, his Rule 11 silence would have left
him with clear but uncorrected Rule 11 error to place on the Government's shoulders. This result might, perhaps, be sufferable if
there were merit in Vonn's objection that applying the plain-error
standard to a defendant who stays mum on Rule 11 error invites the
judge to relax. The plain-error rule, he says, would discount the
judge's duty to advise the defendant by obliging the defendant to
advise the judge. But, rhetoric aside, that is always the point of the
plain-error rule: the value of finality requires defense counsel to be
on his toes, notjust the judge, and the defendant who just sits there
when a mistake can be fixed cannotjust sit there when he speaks up
46
later on.
Underlying the radical reformation of Rule 11 in 1975 was a congressional intention to ensure that defendants were informed of, and

46 Id. at 73. The Court also cited with approval to the Advisory Committee's
notes:
We think... that the significance of Congress's choice to adopt a harmlesserror rule is best understood by taking the Advisory Committee at its word.
"It must.. . be emphasized that a harmless error provision has been added
to Rule 11 because some courts have read McCarthy as meaning that the
general harmless error provision in Rule 52(a) cannot be utilized with respect to Rule 11 proceedings." The Committee said it was responding simply to a claim that the harmless-error rule did not apply. Having pinpointed
that problem, it gave a pinpoint answer. If instead the Committee had taken
note of claims that "Rule 52" did not apply, or that "neither harmless-error
nor plain error rule applied," one could infer that enacting a harmless error
rule and nothing more was meant to rule out anything but harmless-error
treatment. But by providing for harmless-error review in response to nothing more than the claim that harmless-error review would itself be erroneous, the Advisory Committee implied nothing more than it said, and it
certainly did not implicitly repeal Rule 52(b) so far as it might cover a Rule
11 case.
Id. at 71 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes
(1983 amend.)).
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understood, certain information prior to acceptance of defendants'
guilty plea. After all, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Boykin, a
defendant's comprehension and voluntariness could not be presumed
absent some affirmative evidence on record. 47 When Rule 11 was revised the district courts, not the litigatingparties, were charged with the
responsibility to inform and ensure compliance with the various components of the new rule. 48 So seriously was the plain language of this
rule considered, that most circuits followed McCarthy in the years immediately after the 1975 amendments. 49 Thus, despite the broad requirements imposed by the new rule, most circuits viewed each Rule
11 informational item, and an understanding of each such item, as so
essential that judicial neglect with respect to a single item rendered a
50
guilty plea invalid.
Nowhere in Rule 11 is a defense attorney imposed with an affirmative obligation to ensure compliance with the rule. Rather, Rule 11 is
a rule that imposes affirmative duties only upon the judiciary. Nevertheless, despite the plain verbiage of Rule 11, the Supreme Court in
Vonn has now imposed a shared obligation. It is now incumbent upon
both the court and the defendant to ensure compliance with Rule 11,
and if the court neglects its duties under the rule then all is essentially
forgiven unless the presumably uninformed defendant objects to the
court's failure to inform. However unjust this new expectation, the
Vonn standard can admittedly be satisfied with greater facility if a defendant is represented. After all, an attorney learned in the criminal
law would presumably have some familiarity with the details of Rule 11
and be reasonably capable of recognizing a judicial omission under
the rule. However, the same cannot be said for defendants who are
proceeding in a pro se capacity. The inquisitorial methodologies routinely employed by the judiciary, coupled with the disincentives to
contradict and the lack of familiarity among pro se defendants with
the Rule 11 mandates, renders virtually nil the likelihood that a pro se
defendant will either recognize or lodge an objection to a Rule 11
omission. As stated by Justice Stevens in his dissent, "To see the implausibility of this, imagine what such an objection would sound like:
'Your Honor, I object to your failure to inform me of my right to assis47 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
48 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b) (1) ("Before the court accepts a plea of guilty .. .the
court must address the defendant personally in open court. During this address, the
court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands
[various delineated items].").
49 See, e.g.,
LAFAvE, supra note 26, § 21.5, at 1020-21.
50 See id.
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tance of counsel if I proceed to trial.' ,,51 Under the Vonn standard,
pro se litigants will now be expected to meet such expectations, however improbably satisfied.
The onus of this heightened expectation stands to adversely impact defendants regardless of representational status, though the unrepresented-for the reasons just detailed-will certainly be tasked
with a burden that will be virtually impossible to satisfy. As it stands, a
guilty plea entered despite a court's neglect of virtually all of the Rule
11 requirements could still be salvaged provided the defendant failed
to object and was unable to demonstrate that his "substantial rights"
were affected. In the end, an already deeply flawed but fluid guilty
plea acceptance process was sustained by a Supreme Court willing to
sidestep the plain language requirements of Rule 11 and retreat from
the ideals underlying Boykin and McCarthy. And, as demonstrated in
the following discussion of Bradshaw v. Stumpf 5 2 the Supreme Court's
apparent preoccupation with greasing the wheels of the federal guilty
plea process has only continued to manifest itself.
B.

Bradshaw v. Stumpf

In 2005, the Supreme Court once again mollified judicial responsibility under Rule 11 in Bradshaw v. Stumpf 53 The defendant, John
David Stumpf, and two associates, Clyde Daniel Wesley and Norman
Leroy Edmonds, were arrested in connection with the attempted murder of Norman Stout and the murder of his wife Mary Jane Stout.
After traveling along an interstate in Edmond's car, the men stopped
the car along the highway. In need of money (presumably to
purchase gas), Stumpf and Wesley exited the vehicle and approached
the Stout's home, which was approximately 100 yards away. Sometime
after entering the home, both Norman and Mary Jane Stout were
shot. After his arrest, Stumpf eventually admitted to firing the shots
54
that struck Norman Stout, but denied shooting Mary Jane Stout.
An indictment was returned against Stumpf charging him with
"aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and two counts of grand theft."55 Stumpf eventually entered a
guilty plea to the aggravated murder and attempted aggravated mur51 Vonn, 535 U.S. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens further observed that the majority approach assumes "a cunning defendant, who is fully knowledgeable of his rights" and who strategically fails to object
to Rule 11 omissions in order to salvage a winning appellate issue. Id. at 78-80.
52 125 S.Ct. 2398 (2005).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2402-03.
55 Id. at 2403.
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der charges, and, with respect to the aggravated murder count, "to
one of the three capital specifications." 56 Since he was still death penalty eligible, Stumpf argued during the contested penalty hearing that
his role in the murder was comparatively minor because he had only
participated in the scheme at the insistence of Wesley who actually
fired the shots that killed Mary Jane Stout. 57 The government countered that it was Stumpf, not Wesley, who fired the fatal shots. 58 The

government also argued that, irrespective of the identity of the principal actor in MaryJane Stout's death, Ohio law allowed the death penalty to be imposed upon accomplices provided there was a specific
intent to commit murder. 59 The sentencing panel ultimately imposed
60
the death penalty.
During Wesley's trial, however, the prosecution argued to the jury
that it was Wesley, and not Stumpf, who fired the shots that killed
Mary Jane Stout. 61 As a result of this variance in theory, Wesley, while
still on direct appeal, filed an unsuccessful motion with the lower trial
court to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate his death sentence. 6 2 On
habeas review, however, the Sixth Circuit invalidated Stumpf's guilty
plea on the grounds that it had not been entered knowingly and intelligently. 63 The court found, inter alia, that Stumpfs guilty plea to aggravated murder was made "without understanding that specific
intent to cause death was a necessary element of the charge." 64 Given
Stumpfs unwavering denial that he was the triggerman as well as the
trial court's failure to discuss the element of specific intent, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that his plea to an aggravated murder charge was
65
uninformed.
56

Id. The Court dropped the remaining counts of the indictment as well as the

remaining two capital specifications. Id.
57
58

Id.
Id.

59

Id.

60
61
62
63

Id.
Id. at 2404.
Id.
Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 2004), rev'd in part, vacated in

part sub nom. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 125 S.Ct. 2398.

64
65

Stumpf 125 S.Ct. at 2404.
367 F.3d at 607-08. The Sixth Circuit reached its holding, in part, based upon

the following:
Here, the trial judge, before accepting Stumpf's plea, had not informed
the defendant that specific intent was an element of the crime to which he
was pleading, nor had he inquired whether Stumpf had actually shot the
victim or, if not, had specifically intended that she be killed. In the absence
of some inquiry, Stumpfs express reservations of his ability to put on evidence of his version of the crime, along with his attorneys' arguments that
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The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, finding that Stumpf
had been sufficiently informed of the nature of the charges, 66 despite
the trial court's failure to specifically admonish him that specific in-

he did not intend, and was not even present for, the killing of Mrs. Stout,
should have put the trial court on notice that Stumpf was not aware of the
true import of his plea.
The district court did not focus on the question of intent. Rather, it
found that Stumpf's position that he was not the shooter was consistent with
the specicationto which he pleaded guilty. However, in making this finding,
the district court failed to recognize that Stumpf's position is inconsistent
with the charge to which he also pleaded guilty. It is this inconsistency that
gives rise to his claim that his plea was not validly entered.
Generally, a reviewing court presumes that defense counsel has explained the elements of the crime to a defendant pleading guilty, even
where the record does not reflect any statement by counsel to that effect. In
this case, defense counsel did state to the court that they had informed
Stumpf of the elements of the crime. In a typical case, such an assurance
would prevent a reviewing court from finding that a plea was involuntary. In
this case, however, the record clearly establishes that Stumpf sought to preserve his right to argue that he was not the shooter and thus counterbalances
the assurances given by defense counsel that they had explained the elements to Stumpf.
We recognize, of course, that Stumpf need not have been the "principal
offender"-the actual shooter-in order to have specifically intended the
death of Mary Jane Stout. Nevertheless, it is clear from the record of the
factual basis hearing that the state's theory of guilt relied completely on
Stumpf being the principal offender. The prosecution presented no evidence that Stumpf intended Mrs. Stout's death, other than arguing that he
was the actual shooter. In the closing arguments at the evidentiary hearing,
defense counsel, contending that the prosecution had not met its burden
with regard to the basis for seeking the death penalty, effectively challenged
the prosecution's proof as to specific intent to kill. The prosecutor responded that "[a]s to a purpose to kill, whoever shot Mrs. Stout didn't intend to do her any favors when he shot her four times. It seems to me that
shooting a person four times shows what your intent was."
Indeed, the three-judge panel, which presumably knew of the intent element, found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stumpf was "the principal
offender" in the aggravated murder and made no other finding as to specific
intent. Its conclusion in this regard indicates that the panel found that
Stumpf's shooting of Mrs. Stout provided the requisite specific intent, as
there was no other evidence in the record to satisfy this element. Given this
finding, it is unlikely that Stumpf can be said to have knowingly conceded
specific intent to kill by pleading guilty, when he continued to maintain
throughout the proceedings that he had not been the one who actually shot
the victim.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
66 Stumpf, 125 S. Ct. at 2405.
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tent was a necessary element of aggravated murder. 67 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied upon the in-court representations of
Stumpfs counsel during the plea colloquy that they had explained
the elements of aggravated murder to Stumpf, as well as the defendant's confirmation of this representation. 68 The Court explained
that it had
never held that the judge must himself explain the elements of each
charge to the defendant on the record. Rather, the constitutional
prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the
crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the
court usually may rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the
69
charge to which he is pleading guilty.

Without debating the factual intricacies of the case, Stumpf is certainly the Court's most recent, and perhaps most forceful, pronouncement that the guilty plea hearing process is a shared responsibility.
What Stumpf made clear is that defense counsel representations (accompanied by defendant affirmations) can effectively substitute for
defects in the guilty plea colloquial process. Thus, if a defendant was
advised of an informational item under Rule 11 in an extra-judicial
setting, such conversations can serve as an effective substitute for errors that may occur during the required judicial process under Rule
1 1.7 Moreover, as the facts in Stumpf reflect, the in-court representations regarding the extra-judicial conversations need not be sup67
68
69

Stumpf 367 F.3d at 607.
Stumpf 125 S. Ct. at 2405.
Id. at 2405-06 (internal citations omitted).

70 When discussing the district court's failure in McCarthy to provide an explanation during the Rule 11 hearing to the defendant "of the knowing and willful state of
mind charged as of the time of the tax violation," the Court in Vonn considered "the
judge's indifference . . . an affront to the integrity of the judicial system." United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 68-69 (2002). In making this observation, the Vonn
Court recognized that the defendant, through his attorney, had openly contested this
willful mental state at the subsequent sentencing hearing. Id. It should also be noted
that McCarthy's attorneys represented to the trial court that the elements of the tax
offense had been explained to the defendant. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 470 (1969). Yet, three years later in Stumpf the Court expressed a more tolerant
view of such judicial neglect. Despite Stumpf's claims during the plea hearing and
the subsequently held evidentiary hearing that he did not shoot MaryJane Stout, 367
F.3d at 606-07, the Court held that the trial court's failure to discuss the specific
intent element was cured by the admonitions provided outside the courtroom by his
defense attorney, 125 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
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ported with any, let alone any meaningful, evidentiary detail.7 1 No
judicial inquiry, for example, regarding what was said, when it was
said, who was present, and the environment where the purported conversation occurred are required under the lax Stumpf standard. All
that is required is a brief representation (which need only last a few
seconds) to the court containing blanket and largely unsubstantiated
assertions of extra-judicial explanations. Such short shrift commentary can now serve as a cure for judicial oversights during the Rule 11
process.
The road traveled by the Supreme Court since McCarthy has
come almost full circle. McCarthy deemed the requirements of Rule
11 so significant that a court's failure to follow the dictates of the rule
warranted automatic reversal. Indeed, even after the 1975 restructuring of the rule, with its many additional impositions upon the judiciary, most circuits continued to follow this principle. However, today if
a court, after "leading" and "compounding" a defendant through the
Rule 11 process, fails to inform a defendant of an item, or two, or
three under Rule 11, such judicial neglect can now be cured extrajudicially. A defense counsel representation (and an affirmation by
71 The most pertinent exchanges between the court and defense counsel and the
defendant were included in the Sixth Circuit's opinion:
JUDGE HENDERSON: Have you informed your client of the elements of
the offenses with which he is charged, of all defenses which may be available
to him and of all of his Constitutional rights, both State and Federal?
TINGLE: Yes, we have.
JUDGE HENDERSON: Stumpf, I'm going to ask you a number of questions
and if you do not understand those questions you may inquire of your attorneys to better able [sic] you to understand everything that is being asked
you. These have to do with the rights that you have as a person who has
been accused of a crime. Do you understand that you have a constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
JUDGE HENDERSON: With a full understanding that anything that you say
may be used against you, are you willing then to answer questions with regard to your understanding of your rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
JUDGE HENDERSON: Now, you heard the questions that I put to your attorneys, I believe, relative to their advice to you and their counseling of you,
did you not?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
JUDGE HENDERSON: Do you personally acknowledge that your attorneys
have informed and advised you as they say they have?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Stumpf 367 F.3d at 604.
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the defendant) that the omitted item had been explained outside the
courtroom, without any additional evidentiary support, can now cure
judicial neglect with respect to the Rule 11 mandates.
The following subpart will briefly discuss another important aspect of Rule 11, the plea withdrawal rules. It will describe how these
rules work in conjunction with, and as a vital anchor to, the inequitable guilty plea processes just described. More specifically, it will explain how these rules essentially bind unwary defendants to their
decisions to plead guilty, while depriving them of a corresponding
ability to either enforce the underlying plea agreements or pursue
other more favorable disposition alternatives.
C. United States v. Hyde and the Plea Withdrawal Rules
In December 2002, a plea withdrawal provision was added to Rule
11, which provides that a defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty that
has been accepted by the court prior to sentencing if he can satisfy the
court that a "fair and just reason" underlies his request. 72 This rule
change was prompted by the 1997 Supreme Court case, United States v.
Hyde, 73 in which the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea after
it had been accepted, but before the court had accepted the accompanying plea agreement and imposed sentence.7 4 When his effort
proved to be unsuccessful, an appeal followed. 75 The Ninth Circuit
found that Hyde was not bound by the "fair and just reason" constriction, under the then existing Rule 32 (e) ,76 and that he was, therefore,
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right.7 7 The court

reasoned, in part, that the "inextricabl[e]" relationship between the
guilty plea and the plea agreement meant that a court could not accept one without the other.7 8 Therefore, until such time as both the
plea of guilty and the plea agreement had been accepted, the defen72 Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 535 U.S. 1157, 1996
(2001); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. I I (d) (2) (B). The rule also allows a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea without restriction if the court either has not accepted the
guilty plea or if the court rejects the plea agreement. FED. R. CPiM. P. II(d)(1),
(d) (2) (A).
73

520 U.S. 670 (1997).

74 Id. at 671.
75 Id. at 671-72.
76 The plea withdrawal rule had previously been embodied in Rule 32(e) and
contained the same "fair and just reason" standard currently found in Rule 11. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(d); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e) (2000) (amended 2002).
77 United States v. Hyde, 92 F.3d 779, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd. 520 U.S. 670.
78 Id. at 780.
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dant was entitled to freely withdraw his guilty plea. 79 However, the

Supreme Court disagreed. The Court's principal rationale was textual-that the plain language of Rule 11 permits district courts to separately accept guilty pleas and plea agreements. 80 Given this
allowance, the Court reasoned that once a guilty plea had been accepted a defendant could freely withdraw his plea only if the court
rejected the proffered plea agreement. 8 1 Until such time, the Court
determined that a defendant was subject to the fair and just reason
standard.

82

On the surface such a rule might appear just and reasonable. After all, a contrary rule would appear to be an invitation for litigative
chaos. One could easily imagine defendants routinely entering and
withdrawing guilty pleas on a whim, with the effect of disrupting the
efficient administration of justice. However, as I have discussed in
greater depth elsewhere, the only thing unjust about the process is the
current rule prohibiting a defendant from freely withdrawing his
guilty plea up until the time the court accepts the underlying plea
agreement. 8 3 Consider the following sampling.
Plea agreements have traditionally been construed in accordance
with contract law principles. 84 Contrary to the predominant perception that plea agreements are unilateral contracts 85 between the prosecution and defense, plea agreements are actually bilateral
agreements involving three parties-the defendant and prosecution
as joint offerors and the court as an offeree. 8 6 While it is true that the
prosecution and the defense, upon the culmination of negotiations,
enter into what is commonly referenced as a plea agreement, it is critical to understand that such an agreement, standing alone, has no
binding effect whatsoever. In fact, absent assent on the part of the
judiciary, it is wholly impossible for either party to enforce the pur79 Id. at 781.
80 520 U.S. at 673-76.
81 Id. at 676.
82 Id.
83 For a more in-depth discussion of the unjustness of the plea withdrawal rules
and their adverse impact upon defendants who have completed the Rule 11 process,
see Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the Railroadingof
Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863 (2004).
84 Id. at 879.
85 This has been the predominant view among academics and the courts. Id. at
879-80. However, there is also some authority for the notion that plea agreements
are contracts subject to a condition. The article also addresses, and rejects, these
contentions. Id. at 893-99.
86 Id. at 880-92.

2006]

CRUMBS

FROM

THE MASTER'S

TABLE

1913

ported guilty plea contract.8 7 Even if signed, the negotiated instrument
is incapable of any independent significance and remains entirely dependent upon judicial acceptance for its enforceability.8 8 In the end,
a plea agreement is nothing more than a plea offer on the part of the
prosecution and defense to resolve the case pursuant to the proffered
terms in exchange for the court's assent to abide by the terms of the
agreement. In other words, what is offered is a joint promise that the
litigation will be resolved and a guilty plea will be tendered in exchange for the court's verbal promise that it will implement the agreement. This mutual promissory exchange is a classic example of a
bilateral agreement.
Although the parties are tendering an offer in the form of a plea
agreement to the court (and the defendant is rendering performance
via the entry of his guilty plea), Rule 11 requires the defendant to
keep his performance offer open and permit the court time to ponder
the merits of the proffered settlement. Despite the absence of ajudicial acceptance (or the tendering of any consideration), the "fair and
just reason" standard effectively binds the defendant to his offer (and
his performance) and prevents him from pursuing other more optimal litigative strategies. This bilateral reality for the criminal defendant stands in stark contrast to that faced by any other marketplace
offeror. Whereas any other contractor is entitled to withdraw an unaccepted offer and pursue other more advantageous opportunities, the
defendant is essentially bound to his offer without a corresponding
authority to enforce the very plea agreement that prompted his performance (the entering of his guilty plea).89
87 Id. at 881.
88 See United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting the defendant's argument that a plea agreement was a binding contract between the prosecution and the defense when, prior to the court's approval of the agreement, the
government had signed the agreement but then later sought to withdraw from the
agreement).
89 Cook, supra note 83, at 885. The article further contends that this bilateral
conception is consistent with the defendant's pre-plea expectations:
When a defendant elects to waive [his Sixth Amendment jury trial right],
among other constitutional protections, and enter a plea of guilty, it is typi-

cally prompted by the defendant's decision to pursue a negotiated disposition. In other words, the defendant has determined that it is in his optimal
interest to waive his trial right and proceed with a guilty plea pursuant to the
terms detailed in a proposed plea arrangement. It is the defendant's understanding that there is a "deal," and but for this contractual "deal" he would

have persisted in enforcing his right. It is a promissory exchange-the
promise of certain benefits, including possible penal compromises, in exchange for the defendant's promise to enter a guilty plea-that prompted
his decision to change his plea.
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The rules regarding plea withdrawal are yet another example of
the various latent perils that await criminal defendants on the cusp of
entering the guilty plea process. Defendants who enter this arena are
subject to a set of rules and procedures that effectively lure them into
binding admissions of guilt without providing a corresponding right
to enforce the very agreement that prompted them to perform in the
first place. It is notable that Rule 1 's failure to require trial courts to
inform defendants, and ensure their understanding, of the rules regarding plea withdrawal empowers the district courts to accept a defendant's guilty plea without any inquiry whatsoever regarding a
defendant's knowledge of this very critical rule. Though some might
contend that the represented could become learned of such consequences through their attorney-client conferences, the likelihood that
the pro se defendant would become familiar with the complexities
attendant to this rule is, without question, highly improbable.
Whatever the exact probabilities, however, defendants, regardless of
their representational status, are primed to enter guilty pleas with no
requirement under Rule 11 that the courts make any inquiry regarding a defendant's knowledge of his restricted plea withdrawal rights.
The Rule 11 guilty plea hearing is a largely mechanistic colloquial
procedure that effectively expedites the guilty plea process, yet does
little to ascertain the extent of a defendant's knowledge and voluntariness. If during this process a court should fail to comply with the Rule
11 mandates, all is essentially forgiven provided the presumably uninformed defendant fails to object to the court's omission(s). In the
event an objection is not lodged, the defendant is then saddled with
the burden of demonstrating prejudice from the judicial omission in
order to be afforded the opportunity to plead anew. Moreover, judicial oversights can also be cured if representations are made in court
that the omitted information had been conveyed to the defendant in
an extra-judicial setting.
Finally, once the Rule 11 process has been completed, the defendant is essentially bound to his guilty plea decision unless he can proffer a "fair and just reason" in support of a plea withdrawal request or
the court ultimately rejects the proffered disposition. The very instrument that prompted him to ponder an out-of-court resolution-the
plea agreement-served as the attractive enticement that caused him
to forgo his Sixth Amendment jury trial protections and proceed with
the Rule 11 process. Yet, upon completion of the guilty plea hearing,
the defendant becomes effectively bound to his guilty plea decision
Id. at 886.
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without any corresponding ability to enforce the very agreement that
led to his change of plea.
However troubling these pitfalls and consequences may be, they
become all the more disturbing when defendants are on the cusp of
proceeding down this pathway without the assistance of counsel. Iowa
v. Tovar,90 discussed in the next Part, considers the question of what
judicial admonitions might be required by the Sixth Amendment for
those litigants who stand on the brim of this guilty plea process.
II.
A.

IOWA v.

TovAR

The Supreme Court Decision

Iowa v. Tovar,9 1 decided by the Supreme Court in 2004, represents one of the High Court's most recent assaults upon defendant
constitutional interests in the guilty plea context. At issue was
whether two judicial admonishments proffered by the Iowa Supreme
Court were required by the Sixth Amendment to be provided to defendants who seek to waive their right to counsel prior to entering a
guilty plea. 92 Felipe Tovar had been convicted in Iowa state court in
1996, 1998,9 3 and 2001 of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol (OWI).94 Though the 1996 and 1998 convictions
were classified as misdemeanors, Iowa law classified any subsequent
OWI offenses as class "D" felonies. 95 Thus, in an attempt to avoid this
enhancement, Tovar, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Adjudication of Law in the 2001 litigation. 96 In it he argued that his 1996
conviction, which had been obtained via a guilty plea without representation of counsel, was not "full knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"
because of the trial court's failure to fully advise him "of the dangers
97
and disadvantages of self-representation."
90

541 U.S. 77 (2004).

91
92
93
94

Id.
Id. at 77, 81.
Tovar was represented by counsel when he was convicted in 1998. Id. at 85.
Id. at 84-86.

95
96

Id. at 85.
Id.

97

Id. At both his initial appearance and his arraignment in 1996, Tovar ap-

peared without counsel. An Initial Appearance form indicated that he waived his
right to have the assistance of counsel. At his arraignment Tovar affirmatively stated
on the record that he wished to represent himself. At the same hearing, Tovar entered a plea of guilty to the OWI charge. At the time of his guilty plea, there were
four other misdemeanor cases before the court that day. All five of the accused consented to have the court conduct a joint plea proceeding. In accordance with the
Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court conducted a plea procedure in which
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After the trial court denied his motion, Tovar entered a guilty
plea to his third OWI offense. 98 His conviction was later affirmed by
the Iowa Court of Appeals. Though the record plainly indicated that
Tovar had been informed during his plea colloquy of the nature of
the charges and of the sentencing consequences, 99 a deeply divided
Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded his conviction, after
finding that his 1996 guilty plea conviction had violated the Sixth
Amendment:
"[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without
the assistance of an attorney must be advised of the usefulness of an
attorney and the dangers of self-representation in order to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel ....
[T] he
trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and
that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding
whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked. The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his
right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it
is wise to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him and the
range of allowable punishments." 10 0
the court explained certain rights to Tovar that would necessarily be relinquished by
him if he elected to enter a guilty plea. The court also informed Tovar that he would
be forgoing his right to a speedy and public trial by jury, his right to be represented
during the trial by an attorney who could assist him with jury selection, the presenta-

tion of evidence, the cross-examination of witnesses, the making of arguments to the
jury and the court on his behalf, his right to remain silent at trial, his right to be
presumed innocent of the criminal charges, and his right to subpoena witnesses and
compel their testimony. The court further informed Tovar of maximum and minimum penalties attendant to a first OWl offense (to which he expressed an understanding). The court also informed him of the elements of the OWI offense and
found that there was a supporting factual basis. The court then formally accepted
Tovar's guilty plea. At his sentencing hearing, approximately forty days after the acceptance of his guilty plea, Tovar again appeared without counsel. Once again, and
in response to a judicial inquiry, Tovar expressed his desire to represent himself. At
his sentencing, he also was arraigned on a separate charge of driving with a suspended license. Again, and without the assistance of counsel, he entered a guilty plea
to that charge as well. For the OW offense, Tovar received a sentence of two days in
jail (the minimum required sentence) and a $500 fine. Id. at 84-86.
98 Id. at 86. He was sentenced to 180 days imprisonment, with 150 days suspended, three years probation and a fine. Id.
99 Id. at 83-84.
100 Id. at-86-87 (quoting State v. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003), rev'd,
541 U.S. 77).
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Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court found, in the guilty plea context,
that the Sixth Amendment required two additional warnings: (1) that
counsel might be able to uncover viable defenses to the charges at
issue; and (2) that counsel can provide "an independent opinion"
with respect to the wisdom of entering a guilty plea. 10 1 However, the
United States Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, concluding that
the Sixth Amendment did not encompass the two admonitions proffered by the Iowa Supreme Court. Instead, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment only requires that a defendant be informed of the
nature of the charges, of his right to be counseled with respect to his
guilty plea decision, and of the "range of allowable punishments at10 2
tendant" to his guilty plea.
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that a defendant
contemplating a pro se defense must be advised of the "dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation" and that these admonitions must
be "'rigorous [Ilyl' conveyed. ' 10 3 But it added that the required warnings are contextual, and thus varied, cautioning against the imposition
of rigid and inflexible Sixth Amendment mandates. 0 4 For example,
the Court drew a distinction between the warnings required at trial
and those necessary at earlier stages of the litigation. At trial, the
Court noted that counsel could provide meaningful assistance with
respect to, inter alia, the rules of criminal procedure and evidence,
the subtleties of voir dire, and the examination of witnesses.10 5 However, the Court stressed that "less rigorous warnings" were required at
earlier stages, "not because pretrial proceedings are 'less important'
than trial, but because, at that stage, 'the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . are less substantial and more obvious

to an accused than they are at trial."' 10 6 Analogizing to waivers in
alternative Sixth Amendment contexts, the Court added that a valid
waiver demanded only a generalized cognizance of the consequences
stemming from such a decision, 0 7 and that counsel waivers pursuant
to Miranda are valid despite a "'full and complete appreciation of all
of the consequences flowing"' from that decision. 10 8 Thus, the Court
reasoned that the Iowa Supreme Court's more "scripted" interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's demands improperly discounted the
101
102

656 N.W.2d at 121.
541 U.S. at 81.

103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. at 89.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id. (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 289 (1988)).
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92 (quoting Patterson, 487 U.S. at 294).
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principles of generality that typically govern waivers in this constitutional context. 10 9
The following Part will undertake a review of some of the guiding
principles relevant to counsel waivers under the Sixth Amendment
and reveal how these rules, in conjunction with Tovar, have produced
a judicial approach to the waiver issue that is both inconsistent and
unjust. It will not only help explain Tovar's erroneous constitutional
construction and identify the apparent motivations underlying the
Court's decision, but it will also demonstrate why defendants should
be entitled to a more expansive set of judicial admonitions and how
the absence of meaningful warnings help to maintain the efficiency of
the current guilty plea structure.
B.

Critical Analysis

The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 110 This right to counsel attaches whenever an individual is accused of a crime and is confronted
with the possibility of imprisonment."' However, this right does not
attach at every stage of the criminal process, but only at those stages,
such as the guilty plea stage, that are deemed "critical."' 1 2 In addition
to the right of counsel that the Sixth Amendment explicitly affords,
the Supreme Court has also held that this amendment implicitly affords the defendant the corresponding right to decline counsel and to
represent himself.113 While it may be generally stated that a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel must be knowing and voluntary,
and that he must be made aware of the pitfalls associated with selfrepresentation, 1 4 the Supreme Court, as noted earlier, has stressed
that the requirements for a valid waiver are dependent upon the con109 Id. at 92. The Court also made some case-specific findings. It noted that Tovar
did not claim that he failed to understand the nature of the charges or the range of
possible penalties. Nor did he identify what additional information counsel might
have provided, or definitively assert any absence of knowledge of his right to counsel
at the guilty plea stage. As to the latter claim, the Court observed that Tovar merely
asserted that he "may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to plead guilty." Id. at 93 (emphasis added)
(quoting Brief of Respondent at 16, Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (No. 02-1541)).
110 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
111 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 80.

112

Id. at 81.

113
114

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
Tovar, 541 -U.S. at 86-87.
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text in which the waiver is sought.' 15 For example, in Patterson v. Illinois,1 16 the Supreme Court considered whether, in the context of
post-indictment interrogation, the provision of Miranda warnings to a
defendant could also serve as a vehicle through which a defendant's
Sixth Amendment counsel right could be waived. Answering in the
affirmative, the Court explained that warnings regarding the dangers
of proceeding pro se are contextual, with more extensive information
required at the later trial stage than during earlier phases of the
litigation:
[W]e have taken a more pragmatic approach to the waiver question-asking what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage
of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide to an accused at that stage-to determine the scope of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the type of warnings and
procedures that should be required before a waiver of that right will
be recognized.
At one end of the spectrum, we have concluded there is no
Sixth Amendment right to counsel whatsoever at a postindictment
photographic display identification, because this procedure is not
one at which the accused "require[s] aid in coping with legal
problems or assistance in meeting his adversary." At the other extreme, recognizing the enormous importance and role that an attorney plays at a criminal trial, we have imposed the most rigorous
restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant, and the procedures that must be observed, before permitting
him to waive his right to counsel at trial. In these extreme cases,
and in others that fall between these two poles, we have defined the
scope of the right to counsel by a pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular proceeding, and
the dangers to the accused of proceeding without counsel. An accused's waiver of his right to counsel is "knowing" when he is made
aware of these basic facts.
Thus, we require a more searching or formal inquiry before
permitting an accused to waive his right to counsel at trial than we
require for a Sixth Amendment waiver during postindictment questioning- not because postindictment questioning is "less important"
than a trial . . .but because the full "dangers and disadvantages of

115
116

Id.at 88.
487 U.S. 285 (1988).
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self-representation," during questioning are less substantial and
117
more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.
Given the Supreme Court's reluctance to impose a precise mandate, the circuit courts, not surprisingly, have adopted differing approaches to ascertaining a valid counsel waiver under this amendment
when a defendant seeks to represent himself at trial. Though some
circuits strenuously focus their critique upon the precise warnings administered by a district court,' 1 8 most circuits deemphasize this factor
117 Id. at 298-99 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
The Court also stated in a footnote that "[flrom the outset, then, this Court has recognized that the waiver inquiry focuses more on the lawyer's role during such questioning, rather than the particular constitutional guarantee that gives rise to the right
to counsel at that proceeding." Id. at 299 n.12.
118 These circuits either require or suggest the conveyance of explicit warnings of
the dangers associated with self-representation. Illustrative of this approach is the
Third Circuit case of United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120 (3rd Cir. 2002). There, the
circuit detailed a "useful framework" for courts in its district to follow when assessing
whether a defendant's decision to forgo counsel is knowing and voluntary. Id. at 136.
Based largely upon the FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRIcT COURT
JUDGES, § 1.02, at 4-5 (4th ed. rev. 2000), the Third Circuit recommended that the
following questions be posed:
1. Have you ever studied law?
2. Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal action?
3. Do you understand that you are charged with these crimes: [state the
crimes with which the defendant is charged]?
4. Do you understand that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has issued sentencing guidelines that will be used in determining your sentence if you are
found guilty?
5. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in
Count 1, the court must impose an assessment of $ and could sentence you
to as many as years in prison and fine you as much as $ ? [Ask defendant this
question for each count of the indictment or information.]
6. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more than one of these
crimes this Court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that
is, one after another?
7. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I
cannot tell you-or even advise you-as to how you should try your case.
7a. Do you know what defenses there might be to the offenses with which
you are charged? Do you understand that an attorney may be aware of ways
of defending against these charges that may not occur to you since you are
not a lawyer? Do you understand that I cannot give you any advice about
these matters?
8. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence?
8a. Do you understand that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced at trial and that, in representing yourself, you must abide by those rules?
9. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure?
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in lieu of a broader contextual approach. 1 9 For these courts, considerations such as "the defendant's age, mental condition, and prior ex9a. Do you understand that these rules govern the way a criminal action is
tried in federal court. Do you understand that you must follow these rules?
10. Do you understand that you must proceed by calling witnesses and asking them questions, and that, except when and if you yourself testify, you will
not be permitted to tell the jury matters that you wish them to consider as
evidence?
10a. Do you understand that it may be much easier for an attorney to contact potential witnesses, gather evidence, and question witnesses than it may
be for you?
11. I must advise you that in my opinion a trained lawyer would defend you
far better than you could defend yourself. I think it unwise of you to try to
represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar
with court procedure. You are not familiar with the rules of evidence. I
strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself.
12. Now, in light of the penalties that you might suffer if you are found
guilty, and in light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, do you
still desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented
by a lawyer?
13. Are you making this decision freely, and does it reflect your personal
desire?
14. Do you have any questions, or do you want me to clarify or explain further anything that we have discussed here?
If the answers to the foregoing questions satisfy the court that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily desires to proceed pro se, the court would
then state the necessary conclusions, such as:
I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right
to counsel. I will therefore permit the defendant to represent himself (or
herself).
As is evident from the follow-up questions, the purpose of inquiring as
to the defendant's knowledge is only to ascertain the extent to which the
defendant understands the procedure that is to be followed during the
course of the trial, not to assess his legal knowledge or training to determine
his ability to represent himself well.
Id. at 136-37; see also United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 366 (6th Cir. 2004)
(finding valid waiver of counsel right when court asked all but one question from the
Benchbook).
119 See Dallio v. Spitzer, 343 F.3d 553, 563 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[W]hile our court has
strongly endorsed Farettawarnings as a factor important to the knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel we have, at the same time, also rejected rigid waiver formulas
or scripted procedures .

. . ."

(citation omitted)); United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d

1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that "[w]hen no waiver inquiry appears on
the record, we must look to 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the
case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused' to determine whether the record as a whole supports a finding that the waiver was knowing
and intelligent" (quoting Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir.)));
United States v. Edwards, 911 F.2d 1031, 1035 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a trial
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perience with the criminal process, previous hearings in the case, ...
the general nature of the offense charged," and the reasons underlying his request to proceed pro se, are among the factors considered in
conjunction with the judicial colloquy when making this
120
assessment.
Irrespective of the assessment methodology, however, once a
valid waiver is found and a defendant proceeds to represent himself,
the Supreme Court has permitted the courts to impose restrictions
whenever a defendant attempts to freely exercise this constitutional
right at trial. For example, district courts are empowered to impose
standby counsel, even if its decision meets with a defendant's objection.12 1 In this capacity, standby counsel may act so as to "to relieve
the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom
protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles"
during the course of a trial, even if such participation "somewhat undermines the pro se defendant's appearance of control over his own defense."1 22 Even when such actions occur in the jury's presence, the
Supreme Court does not consider such conduct to be per se objectionable.1 23 Though the Court acknowledges that such activities
before a jury are "more problematic," 124 it considers the critical inquiry to be whether an attorney's participation seriously undermines
either a defendant's actual control over his defense or the appearance
before the jury that he was representing himself.1 25 Aside from the
court's compliance with Rule 11 suffices not only as a valid waiver of a defendant's
jury trial rights, but also as a valid waiver of his right to counsel).
120 LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 11.3, at 588; see id. § 11.5, at 597.
121 This allowance permits counsel to provide assistance during the course of a
trial upon request of either the defendant or the court. Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid
Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on Its Edge, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 71
(2003); Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy AfterWashington v. Glucksberg: An Essay
About Abortion, Death, and Crime, 7 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 462 (1998) ("While
Faretta recognized the defendant's right to self-representation,

which 'must be

honored out of "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law,"' it
also permitted courts to appoint 'standby counsel' to aid the defendant in technical
matters to keep the trial running smoothly." (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834-36 (1975))); see LAFAVE, supra note 26, § 11.5, at 594-95.
122 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984) (emphasis added).
123 Id. at 181.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 187. In McKaskle, the Court found that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated when standby counsel, inter alia, examined witnesses
during the course of a trial in order to lay an evidentiary foundation, tendered motions for mistrial, provided the defendant with advice regarding witness examination,
and provided the court with information relevant to the location of witnesses. Given
that the defendant maintained "actual control over his defense" and such participa-
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authority to impose standby counsel, a court, even more obtrusively,
may, on its own volition, terminate the defendant's exercise of this
right altogether if the court determines that he has "engage [d] in serious and obstructionist misconduct." 126 This authority to terminate
has been upheld in instances where, for example, a defendant has
expressed dissatisfaction with a court's rulings and obstructed the progression of the pretrial litigative process, 1 27 and when a defendant has
128
employed this right as a tactic for delay of a trial.
Certainly a principal rationale underlying these limitations is the
assurance that the trial process will proceed efficiently. Indeed, there
is a perception among some that pro se litigants are disruptive and
stand as impediments to this objective. 129 However, there is at least
one additional rationale that presumably motivates these delimitations; namely, that a pro se litigant is simply better served when he can
tion could not "reasonably be thought to have undermined [his] appearance before
the jury," the Court reasoned that the defendant's Sixth Amendment interests were
not compromised. Id. at 184-85.

126 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) ("We are told that many
criminal defendants representing themselves may use the courtroom for deliberate
disruption of their trials. But the right of self-representation has been recognized
from our beginnings by federal law and by most of the States, and no such result has
thereby occurred. Moreover, the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a
defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. Of
course, a State may-even over objection by the accused-appoint a 'standby counsel'
to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary. The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity
of the courtroom." (footnotes omitted)).
127 See United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 1998).
128 See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 680 (9th Cir. 1989).
129 See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right To Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An
Assessment of the Guaranteeof Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 483, 597-98 (1996) ("All of these procedural concerns may pale by comparison to the practical problems and headaches that pro se defendants create for the
nation's trial courts. Quite often, the pro se defendant is either a political extremist, a
misfit, or an incorrigible career criminal with nothing to lose. Many times such defendants merely use their pro se status as a vehicle to advance a particular agenda, act
out their insanity or thumb their nose at the justice system. Most trial judges will
readily admit that even the best of pro se defendants are usually disruptive to the
orderly processes of a trial court."); The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases, 115
HARV. L. REv. 306, 433 (2001) ("For example, if all civil litigants were suddenly to
appear pro se, the disruption to the court system would be catastrophic. It is reasonable to assume that pro se litigants would be unable to frame issues suitably forjudges,
much less respond to questions about the constitutionality of a statute. As a result,
thejudiciary's ability to perform its job would be significantly impaired. Nevertheless,
if the government did not provide lawyers for an indigent civil litigant, that failure
would withstand due process scrutiny under the Court's precedents.").

1924

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.
[

81:5

avail himself of the assistance of counsel. 130 As the Supreme Court
has acknowledged, "[T]he right of self-representation is a right that
when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant." 131 Given the innumerable and complex
procedural and evidentiary rules associated with the trial process, a
trained defense attorney is unquestionably better suited than "even
the most gifted layman" to navigate through these intricate trial
32
waters. 1
In the end, the rules respecting a defendant's constitutional right
to self-representation in the trial context serve, at the very least, a dual
purpose: they enable defendants to proceed in a pro se capacity, while
affording them the opportunity to draw upon an attorney's expertise,
and they preserve a structure through which the criminal trial process
can efficiently proceed.1 33 Nevertheless, the crafting of these rules
comes at a cost, for it disables, to a certain extent, a defendant from
freely exercising his constitutional right to self-representation. Indeed, in the trial context, the familiar refrain that courts should "'indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights"'1 34 seems to take on special meaning. By empowering the courts to impose standby counsel or to terminate a liti130 See Marie Higgins Williams, The Pro Se CriminalDefendant, Standby Counsel, and
the Judge: A Proposalfor Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 789, 805 (2000) ("Perhaps the most compelling justification for the practice of appointing standby counsel
is that the defendant generally has not received a legal education. He is not familiar
with trial procedures, the rules of evidence, or many fundamental principles of law. If
standby counsel is made available to the defendant, he can obtain advice about representing himself. Such advice helps the defendant exercise his right of self-representation more effectively and begins to level the playing field in the courtroom.").
131 McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
132 See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 300 n.13 (1988) ("[A]t trial, counsel is
required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to the rules of procedure and
evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively (including the accused), object to improper prosecution questions,
and much more.").
133 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184 ("A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not
violated when a trial judge appoints standby counsel-even over the defendant's objection-to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand
in the way of the defendant's achievement of his own clearly indicated goals. Participation by counsel to steer a defendant through the basic procedures of trial is permissible even in the unlikely event that it somewhat undermines the pro se defendant's
appearance of control over his own defense.").
134 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
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gant's pro se status altogether, this constitutional right seems to
135
resemble more of a constitutional privilege.
Yet, in the guilty plea context, the apparent necessity to erect
comparable impediments to a defendant's ability to freely exercise
this Sixth Amendment right is apparently no longer evident. In stark
contrast to the trial context, where district courts are plainly encouraged to opine against proceeding in a pro se capacity, 13 6 and, in
certain circumstances, to impose standby counsel or terminate a defendant's exercise of his right to self-representation altogether, 3 7 district courts are not even mildly encouraged to exercise any such
discretion during the guilty plea phase. In fact, assuming a defendant's competency, there are no meaningful impediments whatsoever
to a defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to self-representation in the guilty plea context.1 38 Indeed, the failure of Tovar to find
that the Constitution required even the most basic of admonitionsthat counsel might be able to identify and uncover viable defenses to
135 The Court has also held that a defendant has no constitutional right to selfrepresentation on appeal. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.,
528 U.S. 152, 153 (2000).

136 See United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the
trial court "repeatedly warned Hoskins of the consequences of proceeding pro se and
advised him against it"); United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 1998)
(noting that the trial court "repeatedly advis[ed] Kneeland against proceeding pro
se"); United States v. Pollani, 146 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that the "magistrate judge tried to persuade Pollani against proceeding pro se"); United States v.
Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (observing that the district court
repeatedly warned him against proceeding pro se"); United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d
1186, 1192-93 (2d Cir, 1993) (noting that the district court advised the defendant
against proceeding in a pro se capacity); Strozier v. Newsome, 926 F.2d 1100, 1104
(11th Cir. 1991) (noting that "the trial judge, at a pre-trial appearance in open
court.., three months before trial, had cautioned petitioner against proceeding pro
se after petitioner had expressed dissatisfaction with Auld's performance as his lawyer"); United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409 (11th Cir. 1989) (observing that the
district court "recommended against" proceeding pro se); United States v. West, 877
F.2d 281, 285 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that the trial court "exhort[ed]" the defendant
"against trying to represent himself"); United States ex rel. Jenkins v. Dobucki, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 827, 830 (N.D. I11. 1998) (noting that "[t] he judge engaged in a substantial
conversation with Jenkins about his constitutional right to counsel and advised him
against proceeding pro se"); Gordon v. Taylor, 824 F. Supp. 492, 498 (D. Del. 1993)
(noting that "the judge strongly cautioned Gordon numerous times against proceeding pro se").
137 See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
138 This statement assumes that the defendant validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is competent to enter a guilty plea. See Godinez v. Moran,
509 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1993) (holding that the competency standard to stand trial is
the same as the standard to waive one's counsel right).
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the criminal charges and render advice regarding the wisdom of
pleading guilty-portends a pessimistic future for litigants in this context who seek solace in the Sixth Amendment. Consider the rather
astonishing declaration in Tovar that additional warnings might actually confuse a defendant with respect to the value of counsel at this
stage:
Given "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this]
case," it is far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the
Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision
whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case so
straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than
they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that
a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could plead to a
lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a
tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the
prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources
of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or the defendant
himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be
39
wasted. '
No rational actor, regardless of context, would plausibly suggest
that a consequential decision should be made absent the possession of
sufficient information. This is precisely why Rule 11 evolved from its
original rudimentary form to the complex structure that characterizes
it today. To ensure that defendants were making their guilty plea decisions in an informed fashion, Rule 11 was radically overhauled to
ensure that defendants were informed of basic information relevant
to the guilty plea decision. There is no intimation in the rule that the
provision of additional information might somehow confuse a defendant with respect to the wisdom of pursuing a guilty plea. In the same
vein, it is utterly foolhardy to believe that the two admonitions at issue-or even the provision of additional warnings above and beyond
those deemed necessary by the Iowa Supreme Court-could somehow
confuse or mislead a defendant.
This result is all the more troubling in light of Faretta v. California.140 There, "weeks before" trial was scheduled to commence, the
defendant sought unsuccessfully to waive his Sixth Amendment right
139 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 93 (2004) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).
140 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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to counsel and to represent himself.1 4 ' Finding that the trial court
erred in assigning counsel against the defendant's will, the Supreme
Court held that defendants contemplating a Sixth Amendment counsel waiver must be advised of the dangers associated therewith given
that an accused is potentially forgoing "many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel."1 42 This should be done, according to the Court, so that "'his choice is made with eyes open.' "143
Yet, Tovar seemingly rejects this charge. The Court's rejection of two
rather basic admonitions-which are plainly relevant to the defense
attorney task in the guilty plea context-and its refusal to require any
admonitions beyond those already required by Rule 11 is an apparent
repudiation of the Faretta expectation. Rather than requiring trial
courts to precede the Rule 11 colloquy with a litany of admonitions
designed to illuminate the benefits of counsel during the guilty plea
phase, the Court, instead, refused to require the courts to inform a
defendant of anything with respect to the attorney function. Instead,
the Court required nothing of any substance beyond that already required by Rule 11.14

The environment in which plea bargaining occurs serves to further aggravate this situation. Criminal defendants, typically, must
make an election between entering a guilty plea or pursuing a trial
option, with both alternatives frequently requiring at least some term
of incarceration. Aside from the uncertainty of outcome associated
with trial, other factors may prompt the government to pursue out-ofcourt dispositions. For example, the high volume of cases that currently plague the criminal justice process render it virtually, if not entirely, impossible for a prosecutor to try each case. 1 4 5 Moreover, the
strength of a prosecutor's case can greatly influence not only the decision whether to seek a plea bargain, but also the type of agreement
141
142
143

Id. at 835-36.
Id. at 835.
Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942))

(stating that a defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of

self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing
and his choice is made with eyes open.'").
144 Tovar's requirements that a defendant be informed of the nature of the charge
and the sentencing ramifications associated with a plea of guilty, are duplicative of the
requirements already a part of Rule 11. See FED. R. CRAM. P. 11(b)(1)(G)-(M).
145 Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of CriminalJustice, 66 FoDHAM L.
REv. 2117, 2136 (1988) ("Like plea bargaining, prosecutorial discretion tends to be
defended as a kind of unpleasant necessity. Just as there are too many criminal cases
for all of them to be tried (necessitating plea bargaining), so there are too many
crimes for all of them to become criminal cases in the first place. Limited resources
inexorably require prosecutorial triage.").
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that might be proffered. 146 A case characterized by solid evidence
provides the prosecutor with less uncertainty with respect to a trial
option, and will typically lessen the government's incentive to either
pursue a plea agreement, or, at the very least, proffer more generous
plea concessions. Conversely, a comparatively weaker case raises the
level of uncertainty with respect to a trial option, thereby increasing
the government's incentives to negotiate an out-of-court settlement
and to offer more meaningful sentencing concessions as a carrot to
147
induce an agreement.

Nevertheless, given the enormous bargaining advantages routinely enjoyed by the government, defendants are typically poorly
positioned to demand and extract meaningful concessions from the
government during plea negotiations. Certainly a principal reason
underlying this reality is that defendants have no right-constitutional, statutory, or otherwise-to a plea bargain. 148 Thus, whether a
plea deal is ultimately realized is dependent, at least initially, upon the
prosecution's agreement to even entertain negotiations. Assuming
such assent, the government, generally, is superiorly positioned to dictate the contours of any subsequently agreed upon disposition. Consider, for example, the enormity of power conferred upon the
government by virtue of its authority to indict. This ability to craft
criminal charges provides the government with enormous flexibility
with respect to not only trial strategy but plea negotiations as well. In
this vein, the government is empowered to amend an indictment to
include greater or less severe charges, or even to dismiss any or all
parts of an indictment. Indeed, it is hardly atypical that a prosecutor,
146 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L.
REv. 2463, 2470-71 (2004) ("Apart from these considerations, plea bargains should
depend only on the severity of the crime, the strength of the evidence, and the defendant's record and need for punishment. This ideal asks prosecutors to be perfectly
selfless, perfectly faithful agents of the public interest. The reality is much more complex. The strength of the prosecution's case is the most important factor, but other
considerations come into play. Trials are much more time consuming than plea bargains, so prosecutors have incentives to negotiate deals instead of trying cases. Prosecutors have personal incentives to reduce their workloads so that they can leave work
early enough to dine with their families.").
147 See id. at 2473 ("The shadow-of-trial model, in short, predicts that most trials
should involve weak cases. Self-interest, in contrast, pushes prosecutors toward trying
the strongest cases. Prosecutors can discourage defendants in strong cases from
pleading guilty by refusing to make any concessions, while they can make irresistible
offers in weak cases.").
148 See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) ("[T]here is no constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to
trial.").
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in order to secure a plea to lesser charges, will either front-load an
indictment with charges carrying significant penalties, or will threaten
to indict on more serious charges in the event the government's prof1 9
fered plea deal is refused. 4

Though the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that this
practice violates the Fifth Amendment's due process standard, the
pressures faced by defendants confronted with such choices are undeniably enormous. This quandary is especially cumbersome for the factually innocent defendant, 150 and even more so for the factually
innocent defendant who is proceeding pro se. The arguable human
inclination, in such instances, to seek vindication in the courts is too
often compromised by the enormous and variant risks that typically
accompany the pursuit of a trial strategy. As noted by Professor John
Barkai, a variety of influences, including, but not limited to, the dis-

149 See Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Juy Sentencing. Misgivings About Apprendi, 82 N.C. L. RE\. 621, 664 (2004) ("[P]rosecutors may overcharge to extract
better plea bargains ....
");Carolyn B. Ramsey, Homicide on Holiday: ProsecutorialDiscretion, PopularCulture, and the Boundaries of the CriminalLaw, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1641, 1697
(2003) ("District attorneys often use inflated charges to pressure plea bargains, thus
risking an outcome in which a guilty plea still overstates the defendant's culpability.");
Robert E. Scott & William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1963-64 (1992) (discussing how prosecutors enjoy a bargaining advantage given their
authority to threaten defendants with harsh sentences).
150 See Albert Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1412, 1423-24 (2003) ("As I have emphasized, plea bargaining makes it advantageous for innocent defendants to plead guilty.
It systematically confronts them with offers calculated to overbalance their chances of
acquittal."); Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargainingof
International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 25-27 (2002) ("In sum, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges each have their own good reasons for favoring plea bargaining.
Indeed, although they have largely divergent formal interests and role obligations,
their mutual interest in processing cases efficiently exerts a potent pressure to cooperate and thus to subvert the conflict norms on which the adversary system is based....
A prosecutor's initial charging decisions depend not only on what crime the defendant is suspected of committing but on a host of other factors relevant to the bargaining that is expected to occur. Prosecutors commonly overcharge defendants,
expecting to eventually withdraw some charges as part of a plea bargain. The concessions that prosecutors offer defendants during plea bargaining often depend less on
penologically relevant factors, such as the gravity of the crime or the defendant's
prior criminal record, than on factors related to bargaining. For instance, prosecutors typically offer the greatest concessions in the weakest cases. In other words, the
more likely it is that a defendant will be acquitted, the more attractive the plea offer
that he will receive .... Similarly, because factually innocent defendants tend to have
stronger cases than those who are guilty, innocent defendants typically receive especially attractive plea offers.").
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parity of comparative punishment ranges, ultimately cause many innocent defendants to negotiate their dispositions:
A central concern of any system of criminal justice is to make
certain that innocent defendants are not convicted. Because the
American criminal justice system provides adversarial trials in which
anyone accused of criminal activity may contest his guilt, a presumption arises that innocent defendants will in fact contest charges
lodged against them. Innocent defendants may nonetheless offer
pleas rather than contest their guilt at trial for several reasons. Innocent pleaders can be divided conceptually into two different subcategories. Those in the first group, because of the complexity of
the criminal law, erroneously conclude that they have committed
the crime charged although in fact they have not. The second
group is comprised of individuals who, because of prior experiences
or pressures applied to them as they are processed through the
criminal justice system, conclude that it is in their best interest to
plead guilty although they know they did not commit the crime with
which they are charged.
An innocent defendant who is aware that he did not commit
the criminal act might nevertheless decide to plead guilty because
of: (1) the potentially overwhelming nature of the evidence against
him; (2) the disparity in punishment between conviction by plea
and conviction at trial; (3) a desire to protect family or friends from
prosecution; (4) the conditions of pretrial incarceration; (5) a concern that fuller inquiry at trial may result in disclosure of additional
facts which could increase the sentence in the present case or result
in additional prosecutions; (6) a desire to expedite the proceedings
because of feelings of hopelessness, powerlessness, or despair when
faced with the power of the state; (7) pressure from family, friends,
or attorneys; and (8) "ignorance, deception, delusion, feelings of
151
moral guilt, or self-destructive inclinations."
This inherently coercive atmosphere that accompanies plea bar152
gaining is mitigated, to some extent, by the presence of counsel.
151 John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiriesfor All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary
Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 95-97 (1977).
152 The advantages that counsel can provide in this context are mitigated, however, by the many problems associated with the provision of legal services for the
indigent:

In 1988, for example, the ABA's Special Committee on CriminalJustice in a
Free Society issued a report titled CriminalJustice in Crisis. The committee
concluded that "[i]n the case of the indigent defendant, the problem is ...
that the defense representation is ... too often inadequate because of underfunded and overburdened public defender offices." Further, the report
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The defense attorney is in a position to provide guidance with respect
to the propriety of a proposed plea as well as insight with respect to
the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a trial option. In this
context, counsel can serve as an educator and advocate, as well as a
useful conduit between the defendant and the prosecution. The defense attorney can, therefore, play a vital role in this process and can
temper many of the inevitable uncertainties and pressures inextricably
associated with the plea bargaining process. Yet, despite the advantages that counsel can confer in the plea bargaining context, Tovar
streamlines the ability of litigants-including the factually innocentto proceed down this pathway alone. By withholding basic information regarding the benefits of counsel in this context, the Court has
eased the ability of defendants to expeditiously forfeit their Sixth
Amendment counsel protections-thereby relieving the government
of its burden of persuasion obligations-and sustained the efficiency
of the existing guilty plea system.
Lastly, when considering the finality that accompanies the guilty
plea process, Tovar becomes even more difficult to rationalize. When
a guilty plea is entered, a defendant is sacrificing all of the rights and
privileges that accompany his Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial. It
is an indisputable fact, of course, that counsel, in the context of a trial,
observed that "as a society, [we are] depriving the system of the funds necessary to ensure adequate defense services." There also are numerous law review articles in which the deplorable state of indigent defense has been
exposed, emphasizing the connection between lack of adequate funding and
the quality of representation. The grossly inadequate funding for indigent
defense in capital cases has been a special problem, and this story has been
documented as well. The fees paid to assigned counsel for representation of
defendants in capital and non-capital felony cases differ from state to state,
although in all states the fees are quite modest, so that attorneys willing to
represent the indigent accused are forced to do the work at a significant
discount. Standard hourly billing rates for lawyers in private practice nationwide average $265 per hour for equity or shareholder partners; $247 per
hour for non-equity partners; $179 per hour for associate lawyers; and $178
per hour for staff lawyers. Although fees at these levels are typically paid to
private attorneys who represent the federal government in civil matters, they
are not available in either federal or state criminal courts when a person's
liberty is at stake. In state felony prosecutions-whether a death penalty
case or a non-capital felony-the fees paid are normally much less than $90
per hour and funds are not provided to cover attorney overhead expenses.
Many states, moreover, have caps on the amount that can be earned in a
particular case.
Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for
Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 846-48 (2004) (alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted).

1932

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 81:5

can provide meaningful assistance with respect to evidentiary issues,
jury selection, witness examination, and a whole host of other trialrelated circumstances. Indeed, it is difficult to fathom an instance
when it would be more beneficial for a defendant to proceed to trial
in a pro se capacity. Yet, despite the compelling need for trained
counsel in this context, and the relatively sparse application of evidentiary and criminal procedure rules in the guilty plea context, at no
other juncture is there a greater need for an attorney than when a
defendant is on the cusp of admitting his guilt and relieving the prose1 53
cution of its burden of persuasion.
When a defendant elects to plead guilty, he is deciding to forgo
the very rights and privileges that underlie many of the judicial admonitions routinely provided to defendants in the trial context. Though
imprecisely defined, the Supreme Court has required that defendants
who seek to forgo counsel at the trial stage be provided with admonitions more detailed than at earlier stages of the litigation. 1 54 At a minimum, this constitutional expectation demands that defendants be
informed of the nature of the charges and the associated sentencing
ramifications, 155 and be forewarned of the attendant dangers to proceeding to trial in a pro se capacity. 1 56 With respect to this latter requirement, federal court colloquies, despite wide variances both
procedurally and substantively, have not uncommonly included a detailed listing of the various trial-related benefits that counsel can con153 See Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1945) ("The decision to plead
guilty is a decision to allow a judgment of conviction to be entered without a hearing-a decision which is irrevocable and which forecloses any possibility of establishing innocence. If we assume that petitioner committed a crime, we cannot know the
degree of prejudice which the denial of counsel caused. Only counsel could discern
from the facts whether a plea of not guilty to the offense charged or a plea of guilty to
a lesser offense would be appropriate. A layman is usually no match for the skilled
prosecutor whom he confronts in the court room. He needs the aid of counsel lest he
be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's complexity, or of his own ignorance or bewilderment." (footnote omitted) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 75-76 (1942))); United States v. Akins, 276 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Nowhere is counsel more important than at a plea proceeding.").
154 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 90 (2004); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285,
298-300 (1988).
155 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) ("The fact that an accused may
tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does
not automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be
made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts
essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.").
156 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975).
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fer at this stage of the litigation process. As previously referenced,
both the Third and Sixth Circuits have suggested that the courts in
their respective circuits adopt a colloquial approach modeled after
that contained in the Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges.157 In-

cluded among the admonitions are queries pertaining to the defendant's familiarity with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and whether the defendant is aware that
an attorney can assist with the calling and examination of witnesses
and the gathering of evidence.1 58 Even among the majority of circuits
that have declined to recommend the Benchbook approach, the practice of admonishing defendants regarding the various trial-related
benefits of counsel is relatively commonplace.1 59
Certainly if an attorney's expertise is valued in the execution of
these trial rights-thus, prompting the courts to detail the benefits of
counsel in the context of a trial-it is undeniable that an attorney's
advice should be even more valued when those rights are on the verge
of being sacrificed altogether. Logic would dictate that whatever the
admonition expectations are at the trial stage, those expectations
should most assuredly be heightened during the guilty plea phase.
Yet, the seeming inconsistency of Tovar can be explained, at least in
160
part, by the systemic efficiency that it promotes.
157

See supra note 118.

158 United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2002).
159 United States v.Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding valid waiver
of right to counsel where the court informed the defendant, inter alia, that counsel
could examine and cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence on the defendant's behalf); United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95, 109-10 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding
valid waiver of counsel at trial where the trial court "described various substantive and
procedural aspects of the trial, including empanelment, the government's burden of
proof, opening and closing arguments, questioning of witnesses," and jury selection);
United States v. Turner, 287 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding valid waiver of
right to counsel at trial where the district court informed the defendant, inter alia,
that he "would be required to follow the rules of evidence and other court rules without any assistance from the judge"); United States v. Avery, 208 F.3d 597, 601-02 (7th
Cir. 2000) (finding valid waiver of right to counsel at trial when the defendant was
queried about, inter alia, his knowledge of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1100
(9th Cir. 1999) (finding valid waiver of right to counsel at trial where the trial judge
"informed Farhad about the 'core functions' of an attorney that he would be expected to perform at trial, as well as the superior ability of a lawyer to handle those
tasks," which included the asking of questions and the observance of "the rules of
evidence and courtroom procedure [s]").
160 See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761,

831 (1989) ("[P]roviding counsel at guilty pleas and disfavoring waivers of counsel
are very much like providing counsel and disfavoring waivers at trial. Counsel may
obstruct the proper working of the system in both contexts, because guilty defendants
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Despite the finality that a guilty plea entails, and the latent
hazards associated with a deeply flawed Rule 11 process, Tovar provides the defendant who stands on the brim of this process with virtually nothing more than the meager protections that the Rule 11
process affords. The effect-whether or not by intentional design-is
that the guilty plea process remains well oiled. Tovar, in conjunction
with the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Vonn, Stumpf and Hyde,
has paved the way for defendants to exercise their Sixth Amendment
right to self-representation and their privilege to plead guilty with almost unimpeded authority. In stark contrast to the trial context,
where the impediments to free exercise are regularly invoked, the hindrances to free exercise in the guilty plea context are relatively indiscernible. When judicial economical objectives can be furthered,
Tovar does not stand in the way of the defendant who seeks to contribute to this efficiency. In the end, Tovar is part and parcel of a disturbing trend in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that reflects a
willingness to dispense with basic constitutional protections in order
to maintain an efficient guilty plea structure.
C. Sixth Amendment Construction and Requirements
The question remains regarding the proper analytical posture
that the Tovar Court should have adopted when identifying the judicial admonitions required by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v.
Washington 6 is instructive in this regard. There, the Supreme Court
addressed what standard the Sixth Amendment mandated when assessing whether a defense counsel's performance was so ineffective
that a defendant's conviction or death sentence should be vacated. 162
In reaching its conclusion that a defendant must satisfy a two-pronged
obligation-that his attorney's performance was deficient and that
this deficiency was so serious that there was a "reasonable probability
that... the result of the proceeding would have been different" 16 3 the Court preliminarily observed that while the Due Process Clauses
provide the basic guarantees of a fair trial, the details of that fair trial
right are spelled out in the Sixth Amendment. 164 The Court noted
that among the rights delineated in that Amendment is the right to
are less likely to plead guilty in advance of trial or to take the stand at trial once they

are given lawyers.").
161

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

162
163
164

Id. at 683.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 684-85.
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"the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.' 1 65 In interpreting that
phrase, the Court did not restrict itself to the corners of the Sixth
Amendment text. Instead, it adopted a more expansive contextual
posture. 1 66 Noting that "[t]he Sixth Amendment refers simply to
'counsel,' not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance," the Court concluded that the Amendment's expectations
could be ascertained from "the legal profession's maintenance of standards." 16 7 In describing those standards, the Court outlined the basic
duties of the defense attorney in the trial context. Though nonexhaustive, this contextual review undergirded the Court's conclusion
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel embodied an expectation
that counsel's performance be effective and "reasonable considering
all the circumstances"16 8:
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of
interest. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the
more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important
decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty
to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a
69
reliable adversarial testing process.1
In contrast to the contextual approach followed in Strickland,
Tovais Sixth Amendment construct was noncontextual, thus producing a constitutional interpretation devoid of any meaningful consideration of the core defense attorney functions in the guilty plea context.
165
166

Id.
Id. at 685 ("That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial along-

side the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The
Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to
produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether
retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. For
that reason, the Court has recognized that 'the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel."' (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970)).
167 Id. at 688 ("The Sixth Amendment refers simply to 'counsel,' not specifying
particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. The
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.") (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955))).
168 Id.
169 Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980)).
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As can be gleaned from Strickland, a meaningful review of the defense
attorney function can not only provide a foundation upon which to
interpret the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel provision when
presented with an ineffectiveness claim, but it can provide a similar
foundation when attempting to derive the Amendment's expectations
regarding the waiver of that right. It is axiomatic that an accurate
gauge of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel clause should not
infrequently include some level of review of the relevant counsel role.
Thus, the meaning of the Amendment in the context presented in
Tovarwould seem to require an appreciation of the primary functions
of the defense attorney at or about the time of the change of plea. In
other words, to properly interpret the Sixth Amendment in formulating judicial admonitions with respect to the waiver of counsel in the
guilty plea context necessarily requires an underlying appreciation of
the core defense attorney functions during that phase of the litigation. Considering Faretta's stated objective that defendants should
make such waiver decisions with open eyes, it would follow that the
courts should provide admonishments detailing the pertinent benefits
of counsel in a given setting. The following subsection addresses this
question and identifies the most relevant attorney duties during the
guilty plea phase.
1. Relevant Defense Attorney Functions
The defense attorney performs a variety of critically important
functions during the guilty plea process which fall within the following
broadly-stated categories: the identification of relevant defenses, plea
agreement strategies, and sentencing issues. As intimated by the Iowa
Supreme Court, a core duty of any criminal defense attorney is to
identify and assess the viability of possible defenses. 170 Whether at
trial or when assessing a proposed negotiated resolution, the identification of possible defenses is an inextricable aspect of the defense attorney function that is equally relevant at all stages of the litigation
process. Given the law's complexity, pro se defendants are typically illequipped to adequately comprehend the elements of an offense, assess the government's evidence in relation to those elements, and
identify those defenses most pertinent to the charges. 17' As noted by
170 Statev. Tovar, 656 N.W.2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003), rev'd on othergrounds, 541 U.S.
77 (2004).
171 See Brief for National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7, Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (No. 02-1541), 2003 WL
23051967 [hereinafter National Ass'n Brief]. Professor Steven Duke provides addi-

tional examples of this type of analysis:
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Professor William Stuntz, it necessarily follows that a defendant's conception of guilt might not necessarily correspond with the law's
expectations:
It is thus vitally important that there be some mechanism for checking the accuracy of pleas that protects the innocent to roughly the
same extent as does the trial, with its adversary presentation of evidence and heavy burden of proof on the state. One might argue
that the suspect's own disincentive to confess is a sufficient mechanism. But even aside from the problem of seemingly crazy confessions, accurately assessing his own guilt may be difficult for the
defendant. Substantive criminal law contains many complexitiesintent standards, jurisdictional provisions, defenses, and so forth.
The defendant may be 'guilty' in a layman's sense, and so be willing
to confess, and yet may have a viable defense that he ought to invoke, or may be pleading guilty to the wrong grade of crime. Thus,
unlike police interrogation, the plea proceeding requires someone
who is legally trained to check the accuracy of the defendant's
confession.

172

The defense attorney is also responsible for assessing the values of
various plea agreement alternatives against the merits of pursuing a
trial option. Absent the dismissal of a case, each criminal matter must
necessarily culminate in either some form of plea agreement or by a
conviction or acquittal at trial. Thus, an unavoidable, yet potentially
intricate, aspect of any criminal defense attorney's work is to give appropriate weight to these disposition alternatives and tender a recommendation to a client who is relatively uninformed about the values of
each option. An inevitable aspect of this analysis is to identify and
consider the various types of guilty pleas and plea agreements that
might be available. Aside from the standard guilty plea, where the
To suggest just a few situations where the absence of counsel would likely
have a decisive impact, consider the following hypothetical cases: The defendant pleads guilty to driving while intoxicated without realizing that the results of his breathalyzer test are suppressible. An innocent defendant pleads
guilty without realizing that he has an entrapment defense, a duress defense,
or that his intoxication negates the specific intent required by the crime.
The defendant pleads guilty to what he thinks is a nonserious theft without
realizing that the consideration of his relevant conduct, including uncharged or acquitted conduct, will likely lead to a sentence at the high end
of the statutory range. The defendant pleads guilty to a minor felony to
resolve the case quickly and get on with his life without realizing that the
conviction will lead to his deportation. An attorney's role at the guilty plea
stage is vital and extensive.
Id. (footnote omitted).
172 Stuntz, supra note 160, at 830-31.
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defendant simply pleads guilty to the charged offense(s), there exist
three other types of guilty pleas. First is the conditional guilty plea.
When a defendant enters a standard guilty plea, he necessarily forfeits
1 73
his right to contest any alleged pre-plea constitutional breaches.
However, conditional guilty pleas were added to Rule 11 to allow defendants the opportunity to pursue agreed-upon constitutional issues
without having to exercise his jury trial right in order to preserve this
option.

17 4

The other two available pleas-nolo contendere and Alford
pleas-are far less common and more difficult to conceptualize. In
essence, pleas of nolo contendere allow a defendant to accept punishment without having to admit or deny his guilt to the charged offense(s). Such pleas also preclude estoppel claims in subsequent
litigations. 175 Alford pleas, on the other hand, involve defendants who
assert their innocence, but admit that prosecution's evidence is likely
sufficient to obtain a conviction. 176 Unlike pleas of nolo contendere,
177
Afford pleas do not preclude subsequent estoppel arguments.
173 Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) ("When a criminal defendant
has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which
he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He
may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing
that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in
McMann.").
174 FED. R. CM. P. 11(a)(2).
175 Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1370
(2003).
176 Id. at 1372.
177 Id. at 1373. Professor Bibas explains the differences between pleas of nolo
contendere and Alford pleas:
At common law, a defendant could ask the court to impose a merciful
sentence without confessing guilt and without estopping himself from later
pleading not guilty on the same facts. This procedure became the formal
plea of nolo contendere, under which the defendant admits guilt for purposes of the present case but creates no estoppel. Today, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure allow defendants to plead nolo contendere with the
permission of the court. Most states likewise allow nolo contendere pleas,
which are sometimes called no contest pleas, although many of these states
require the court's consent.
The Alford plea gives defendants another way to plead guilty without
admitting guilt. In North Carolina v. Alford, Henry Alford was charged with
the capital crime of first-degree murder and "faced . . . strong evidence of
guilt." Rather than go to trial, he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, a
noncapital crime, while protesting his innocence. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that defendants may knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty even while
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In addition to the various types of guilty pleas, Rule 11 has also
identified three different forms of plea agreements. One type is when
the government agrees to dismiss, or not to pursue, certain criminal
charges. 178 The other two pertain to the sentencing recommendation
that the government will tender to the court. An agreement containing a nonbinding recommendation allows a court to impose sentence
unencumbered by any sentencing requests, 179 while a binding recommendation obligates the court to impose a specific sentence upon the
court's acceptance of the plea instrument.18 0 Within the context of
these agreements, it is not uncommon for defense counsel to negotiate an additional term obligating the defendant to provide the government with some form of cooperative assistance. Pursuant to this
term, a defendant who assists the government in its investigative and
litigative endeavors is eligible for a sentencing reduction beyond that
typically available under a more ordinary guideline analysis. i8 1
In weighing these strategies, a defense counsel must necessarily
consider the sentencing ramifications associated with each option.
Aside from advising a client about comparatively basic information,
such as a defendant's maximum exposure under a statute, the attorney is in a position to detail the intricacies of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, as well as any possible mandatory minimum penalties,
protesting their innocence if the judge finds "strong evidence of [the defendant's] actual guilt." . . . The Court noted that Alford's plea was similar to a
plea of nolo contendere. It held that if a defendant can plead nolo contendere while refusing to admit guilt, he should also be able to plead guilty
while protesting his innocence.... Although these pleas are not forbidden
by the Constitution, neither are they required. Because defendants have no
right to plead guilty, judges may refuse to accept Alford pleas and states may
forbid them by statute or rule. Most states, however, have followed suit and
permitted Alford pleas (sometimes called best-interests pleas).
Alford and nolo contendere pleas differ in two main ways: First, nolo
contendere pleas avoid estoppel in later civil litigation, while Alford pleas do
not. Second, defendants who plead nolo contendere simply refuse to admit
guilt, while defendants making Alford pleas affirmatively protest their
innocence.
Id. at 1370-73 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
178 FED. R. CriM. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
179 FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
180 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
181 See Peter B.Krupp, The Return ofJudicialDiscretion:FederalSentencing Under "Advisory" Guidelines After United States v. Booker, BOSTON BJ., Mar.-Apr.2005, at 18, 20
("In cooperation cases that do not involve a minimum mandatory penalty, sentences
lower than the Guidelines range have been authorized under U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1, but
only '[u]pon motion of the government' based on its finding that 'the defendant has
provided substantial assistance' to the government." (alteration in original)).
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which might influence a defendant's sentence.1 8 2 Prior to United
States v. Booker1 83 and United States v. Fanfan,18 4 the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provided a determinate sentencing structure that largely
obligated district courts to impose sentences within specified
ranges. 18 5 However, with the issuance of the Booker and Fanfan decisions in 2005, the Guidelines were rendered advisory, 18 6 thus freeing
the district courts from the strictures that characterized the former
system. Nevertheless, the courts were instructed that the Guidelines
still had to be considered, and that sentences imposed would, thereafter, be reviewed for reasonableness. 18 7 How reasonableness is to be
determined, however, remains an open question. In fact, that issue is
but one of an array of issues that continue to linger in the wake of
these decisions. Unanswered questions regarding the impact of Booker
and Fanfan upon upward and downward departures, upon cooperation cases, and upon career offenders, and armed career criminals are
but a sampling of the matters that still await a definitive judicial
response. 188

2.

Recommendations

Each of these areas-the identification of relevant defenses,
guilty plea strategies, and sentencing issues-are core functions of a
defense attorney during the guilty plea process. Certainly, the Iowa
Supreme Court was correct in its determination that the admonitions
182 Professor Duke further notes that defense attorneys can also provide insight
with respect to the collateral consequences associated with a plea of guilty:
Defense counsel's job is to assure that the decision to plead guilty, if made, is
desirable from the defendant's perspective. To give advice on the desirability of a plea, defense counsel needs to know an array of factual and legal
considerations and possible consequences unrelated to the subject matter of
the plea colloquy. Collateral consequences, for example, are not even alluded to in the plea colloquy yet they are a central concern in a great many
guilty plea decisions, especially those involving driving under the influence
of alcohol, which can carry with them loss of drivers' licenses, civil liability
for damages, disqualification for employment or professional licensing, and
can elevate subsequent convictions to felonies. A first time offender is very
unlikely to be aware of these risks in pleading guilty. Only his attorney is
likely to inform him of them. A defendant who lacks such advice cannot
make an informed decision about the desirability of pleading guilty.
National Ass'n Brief, supra note 171, at 3.
183 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
184 543 U.S. 220 (consolidated with Booker).
185 Id. at 233.
186 Id. at 245-46.
187 Id. at 261.
188 See Krupp, supra note 181, at 20.
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that it identified were pertinent to the identification of relevant defenses and plea agreement strategies. Moreover, Tovar rightly concluded that an attorney's advice with respect to sentencing
consequences was mandated by the Sixth Amendment. Though the
respective courts offer competing views of the compass of the Sixth
Amendment, it is difficult to ascertain Tovar's apparent constitutional
distinction between an attorney's advice with respect to sentencing
matters versus that of plea agreement strategies and possible defenses.
Each of these functions are indispensable aspects of the attorney's
function during the guilty plea stage. In fact, each aspect is so central
to a defense attorney's function that it is impossible to prioritize these
roles.
Thus, district courts should be required, via the Sixth Amendment, to inform a defendant that an attorney can help identify possible defenses, render advice regarding sentencing issues, and provide
an educated opinion with respect to the wisdom of pursuing a particular plea deal in light of other possible dispute resolution options. Nevertheless, greater specification of the latter two categories is required
if the Sixth Amendment is to have teeth in this context. To adopt a
more generalized approach would unnecessarily risk a perfunctory
recitation by the judiciary of these attorney functions and ultimately
undercut the informative objectives which underlie the Sixth Amendment admonitions. Therefore, to effectively convey the significance
that attends a decision to bypass attorney representation, and to better
ensure that a defendant's waiver decision is knowing and intelligent,
the Sixth Amendment must require courts to provide information
that sufficiently, yet succinctly, describes the attorney function in the
identified categories.
The benefits associated with a skilled attorney capable of rendering advice with respect to a proffered plea disposition are multifold.
Not only, as referenced earlier, is a criminal defense attorney knowledgeable of the various plea and plea agreement options, as well as
the appellate waivers that typically attend a plea of guilty, but he is also
skilled in assessing the value of the various disposition alternatives,
including the trial option. 18 9 In making these comparative assessments, and in tendering a recommendation to his client, the attorney
would necessarily have to consider, among various other factors, the
significant constitutional protections afforded a defendant who elects
to go to trial. Constitutional rights such as the right to a jury trial, to
be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify
189

See supra notes 170-88 and accompanying text.
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and present evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses are
all part of the evaluative equation. Indeed, to understand and fully
appreciate the value of a particular plea option one must understand
and fully appreciate the value of the alternatives to that option. This
necessarily includes an appreciation of the trial option and all its attendant benefits. Therefore, to better ensure that defendants contemplating the waiver of counsel fully comprehend the potential
evaluative benefits of counsel in the guilty plea context, the Sixth
Amendment should require that defendants be admonished that
counsel can render advice regarding the array of available plea and
plea agreement possibilities, the various appellate consequences that
attach to most guilty pleas, as well as the constitutional protections
outlined above that necessarily attach at trial. This admonition will
inform defendants of the essential informational benefits that counsel
can provide when performing this evaluative function, and, thus, better equip defendants to make an informed decision prior to pursuing
a self-representation strategy.
Moreover, with respect to sentencing matters, the Sixth Amendment should require that courts advise defendants that, in addition to
providing general advice regarding the sentencing ramifications associated with particular disposition alternatives, counsel can also explain
how certain other sentencing features may adversely impact his sentence. As referenced earlier, complex sentencing guideline structures, mandatory minimum provisions, and recidivist statutes all stand
to adversely influence a defendant's sentencing determination. For
example, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, a federal recidivist law, mandates a life sentence for any individual who is
convicted in federal court of a "serious violent felony" and who has at
least two prior "serious violent felony" convictions or has "one or
more serious violent felonies and one or more serious drug offenses."1 9 0 The issue presented in Tovar, in fact, arose from an attempt to avoid a sentencing enhancement required by a recidivist
statute that upgraded a third drunken driving conviction from a misdemeanor to a felony. 191 Mandatory minimum provisions contained
193
in the Controlled Substances Act1 92 and certain firearm offenses
subject defendants, irrespective of prior criminal history, to prison
190 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A) (2000).
191 See supra text accompanying note 95.
192 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000).
193 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)l)(A)(i) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (specifying
that a five-year mandatory minimum applies to any individual who uses, carries, or
possesses a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking
crime).
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terms of at least five years. Given the potential complexities and serious ramifications that can manifest during the sentencing process, admonitions regarding each of these potential influences-sentencing
guidelines, mandatory minimum statutes, and recidivist laws-as well
as the maximum available penalties should also be included as part of
the Sixth Amendment warning detail.
Finally, the Supreme Court should encourage district courts to
explicitly caution defendants who are contemplating a guilty plea
against proceeding in a pro se capacity. As noted, courts across virtually every circuit routinely provide this admonition whenever a defendant seeks to assert his right to self-representation in the trial
context. 194 Furthermore, the Court should remind district courts of
their authority to impose standby counsel, not only in the trial context, but presumably in the guilty plea context as well. Admittedly,
depending on the circumstances, such an appointment might neither
be practical nor feasible. Any number of factors might preclude such
an assignment, including the limited time frame that often accompanies guilty plea decisions, the complexity of the litigation, and an attorney's unfamiliarity with a case. Nevertheless, by issuing this
reminder, district courts will be implicitly encouraged to appoint
standby counsel in appropriate instances, thereby affording pro se defendants the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to making such
a critical election.
CONCLUSION

The procedural inadequacies and substantive unfairness that currently mar the federal guilty plea process greatly aggravate the uncertainty that naturally accompanies the admission of one's guilt. The
leading and compound questioning that characterize Rule 11 hearings, coupled with the recent Supreme Court decisions in Vonn,
Stumpf and Tovar, work together with the plea withdrawal rules to
prod defendants through the guilty plea process and keep their pleas
intact. The established rules plainly reflect an unfortunate federal priority that seemingly values the fluidity of the guilty plea structure over
the provision of information critical to a defendant's understanding
and appreciation of his guilty plea rights as well as his rights under the
Sixth Amendment.
Prior to entering this territory, defendants seeking to make an
informed choice should be sufficiently learned about the various consequences that attend to a decision to waive their right to counsel. If
194

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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adopted, the recommendations contained in this Article will provide
the defendants with the basic information regarding the benefits of
counsel in the guilty plea context. Perhaps many, or even most, defendants will discount the admonitions and persist in their desire to
represent themselves. Irrespective of the ultimate percentage, however, the suggested admonitions will not only provide defendants with
the information relevant to the benefits of counsel, but they will provide an appearance of propriety to a federal guilty plea process that is
sorely in need of a facelift.

